Introduction
In the fall of 2008, the Icelandic banking system collapsed, giving rise to a general economic recession and currency crisis. The size of the banking system and the severity of the events rendered both the Icelandic government and its central bank unable to save the insolvent financial system. The dire situation was mirrored 1,000 miles to the southeast, as Ireland entered into a similar banking crisis. Without a concerted effort to bail out its banking system, it would be brought to its knees like its Nordic neighbour's. The sentiment of the time was captured in a common joke:
"What's the difference between Ireland and Iceland? Six months and one letter."
Today each country is slowly exiting its recession, though not without considerable hardship along the way. In general, output has recovered stronger in Ireland while employment growth is more robust in Iceland. In many ways each country pursued an opposite policy response to their recessions: whether it be concerning monetary policy, banking guarantees, nationalizations of the financial sector, or capital controls on the economy.
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In this article, I assess the distinct responses and separate the wheat from the chaff. Neither country was able to construct an optimal policy response, though pieces of each response have merit. I conclude with some lessons for countries in similar situations -small open economies with large financial sectors.
Nationalizing the Financial Sector
The comparison between Iceland's and Ireland's crisis responses typically centres on the idea that Ireland bailed out its banking sector, while Iceland allowed its to default. Although this is true in some ways, it understates the role of the Icelandic government in saving its own banks.
The Liquidation of the Icelandic Financial Sector
The size of the Icelandic banking system, and more importantly the extent of its foreigndenominated liabilities, exceeded the ability of the government or the Central Bank of Iceland (CBI) to bail out. The big three Icelandic banks-Kaupthing, Glitnir, and Landsbankidominated the Icelandic banking sector, holding almost 80 percent of its banking assets. More strikingly, these assets amounted to 1,100 percent of Icelandic GDP in 2007 (Buiter and Sibert 2008) . By comparison, the U.S. banking sector's total assets in 2007 were less than the size of the whole economy and were spread over a much less concentrated banking industry.
In the initial stages of the crisis of 2008 the Icelandic government did attempt to nationalize the financial system in an attempt to save it. Most notable was the September 29 announcement that Glitnir, the third largest of its banks, was to become effectively nationalized via a €600 million purchase of its assets by the government. This, and subsequent attempts to nationalize the banks, failed to materialize and the country's Financial Supervisory Authority (FME) took over the banks to place them into receivership. The scope of the debts incurred was beyond the ability of the government to secure, and their denomination in foreign currency made the CBI unable to guarantee them. By October 8, all three of the large Icelandic banks had been similarly placed into receivership. Not strictly bailing out the Icelandic banks and placing them into receivership allowed the sovereign of Iceland to remain solvent due to its unwillingness (and inability) to guarantee the banking sector's debts.
Placing the banks into receivership has oftentimes been misconstrued as allowing them to fail. In fact, the FME ring-fenced the domestic operations of these banks using a modification of the good bank-bad bank model employed in Sweden in 1992. Instead of just isolating toxic from clean assets, however, they opted to split the banks along geographic lines in an effort to protect
Iceland from international default (Danielsson 2011a ). Unfortunately few assets of suitable quality existed for either the good or the bad bank, effectively rendering the new, albeit smaller banks in trouble and the government on the hook for domestic deposit insurance payouts. "New"
(nýi) banks were formed to provide for the continued banking operations of "Icelandic families and businesses" (Financial Supervisory Authority 2008a; b; c) . Emergency legislation passed on October 7 by the Icelandic parliament gave depositors and the country's deposit insurance plan priority over other claims to banks. Domestic assets and liabilities were transferred to the new banks. Deposits in foreign branches were given priority status to the assets held in the old banks.
Bondholders of the banks-both new and old-were left with claims to the assets that remained in the old banks. In this way much of the banking debt was "repudiated," though it is clear that depositors (especially domestic depositors) were given priority (Baldursson 2011 ).
The Icelandic government lent these three new banks €7.96 billion in a bid to recapitalize them, pushing the public debt to more than 70 percent of the country's 2008 gross national income. This action placed Icelandic public finances on an unsustainable trajectory (Danielsson 2011b ) and created what some may call a "dysfunctional" banking system, more interested in recovering its assets from the old banks than in providing core banking activities (Danielsson 2011a) . While this has reduced the risk of a sovereign default by ensuring banks put solvency issues at the forefront, it has limited banks' abilities to fund investment activities essential to growth.
The Nationalization of the Irish Financial Sector
Faced with the real possibility of having its banking system collapse, in September 2008 the Irish
Ministry of Finance guaranteed all senior bondholders and extended its deposit insurance guarantee to an unlimited amount. The latter policy had the beneficial effect of generating additional capital, which flowed from other troubled European countries to the perceived safety of the Irish banking system. It also created a contingent liability for the Irish government of about 200 percent of GDP (Connor et al. 2010: 5) . Political tensions grew because Ireland's European neighbours were unhappy about its unilateral guarantee, which pushed them to follow suit with their own deposit guarantees in an attempt to stifle deposit outflows.
By December of that year, the Irish government had spent €5.5 billion to take controlling 
Discretionary Costs of the Bailouts?
As a consequence of this one-time payment to the banking system, Iceland's public deficit has not swelled today due to payments to sustain its banking sector-the cost has already been incurred. In Ireland this is decidedly not the case. Additional public sector payments to sustain its zombie banking system-one which is insolvent but sustained by government transfers-have become the norm. Iceland continues to run a public deficit, but not to sustain its banking sector.
Instead, strained public finances are the result of decreases in tax revenue from the crisis coupled with an increased drain on its services due to plush unemployment insurance payments and other transfer schemes. Indeed, in 2009 government transfers to households increased to 8.2 percent of GDP, up from 6.1 percent the previous year. Likewise, "public social protection expenditures" increased to 11.3 percent of GDP, up from 8.9 percent in 2009 (Ólafsson 2011: 12) . While it could get its deficit under control today by cutting other discretionary spending, Ireland cannot do the same until it allows its banking sector to fail because continual transfers have become necessary to its continued functioning. Indeed, as illustrated in Source: Eurostat
The current unsustainable path of Iceland's public finances is only possible through the $2.1 billion IMF-supported program enacted in 2008. The ability of the government to continue running large deficits has allowed the country to set itself on a path that must be corrected before insolvency fears re-emerge.
Internal or External Depreciations?
Perhaps the greatest distinction in the aftermaths of the two countries' crises is found in their exchange rate regimes. With its independent currency, Iceland's króna depreciated quickly as banks sold off domestic assets to fund foreign liabilities. Ireland succumbed to an exchange rate determined in large part by the eurozone's economic strength, as well as by policies enacted in
Frankfurt by the ECB with little regard for the country's fundamentals (Sharkah and Pawela 2010) .
Was Iceland's Ability to Depreciate Beneficial?
In response to increased foreign claims on Icelandic banks, the sale of domestic assets This króna depreciation has benefited Iceland, but only with a lag. The reason is not in the effectiveness of the depreciation to stimulate exports, but rather in the lack of domestic productive capacity to produce goods to export (Bagus and Howden 2011a: 112) . In one sense, by saving the defunct banks in the form of their new versions with government money, parts of an unsustainable banking model have been sustained artificially, and resources have not been redirected to sustainable paths. The fishing industry, for example, can export to help the island in its recovery, but its output has been slow to respond to its price advantage due to a relative lack of labour. This is partly because it is time-consuming for workers to learn skills for a new job.
Given that the seafood industry directly and indirectly accounts for 26 percent of Iceland's GDP, and up to 8 percent of its labor force (Sigfusson and Arnason 2011) , inhibiting this key sector from growing will prolong the crisis.
Icelandic inflation totalled approximately 28 percent from 2008-09, as the CBI moved to paper over banking and deposit insurance losses (table 3) . Iceland's ability to inflate some of its debt away solved one apparent problem but may exacerbate a larger one. The swift depreciation allowed the CBI to honour some of its pledges made to domestic residents though it did nothing to help those who had their debts denominated in a foreign currency, nor did it aid exporters as much as might at first blush be assumed. As the financial sector had some of its debts inflated away, losses were not as great as would otherwise have been the case. While this had the immediate effect of softening the blow, it hindered the exit of workers from this area to more sustainable sectors. As a result, export sectors that can generate capital through exports-such as the seafood industry-have been unable to expand as quickly as would otherwise be the case.
Some relevant prices in the country have fallen over the past four years. In particular, Second, one problem in the boom was not one of all prices inflating to the same degree. As credit was injected into the economy asymmetric affects resulted, sending erroneous price signals to investors. As an example, cheap credit engendered a housing boom, leading property prices to rise faster than other prices. As a consequence, many Irish resources were directed to the real estate market, at the expense of other productive activities. At the peak of the boom, 13 percent of Irish employment was in the construction industry, and it produced 24 percent of the Irish gross national product, as opposed to an average of 12 percent for the rest of Western Europe (Kinsella 2012 Third, while a currency depreciation will aid exporters to some degree, it has two significant drawbacks. The first of these is that an expansion of the money supply is necessary to depreciate a currency, and such a policy places upward pressure on prices (as was the case in Iceland). The result is potentially nil, as the two effects may counter each other. The second drawback is a consequence of the first-any depreciation of the currency aids one group while harming another. In this case, exporters may be aided, while domestic consumers and producers will see their costs increase, and their real savings dwindle, so that a decline in savings through an inflationary policy will hinder recovery.
The preceding discussion is not to imply that price deflation has been costless or easy in Ireland. It is rather a question of when the costs will be incurred. Although prices were quick to adjust downwards, there was a short-run decrease in output until this happened. While this could have been somewhat mitigated by an inflationary policy, as in Iceland, it would have prohibited important relative price adjustments from taking place. Deflation has allowed relative prices to realign themselves in a bid to better signal to entrepreneurs those avenues of investment more conducive to growth. Thus, even though Ireland was locked into a currency union and unable to unilaterally allow its currency to adjust to regain competitiveness, it was able to make the necessary price adjustments domestically.
Not only do these adjusting prices allow entrepreneurs to better see what avenues of investment are more valued, they also allow important costs to readjust. The decline in housing prices has reverberated backward to adjust downward input costs, including labour costs for construction workers. While declining incomes for these workers may seem like a negative result, it allows workers to realize where they are most valued and readjust their employment accordingly. In many ways we can sympathize with Huerta de Soto (2012) as he refers to the euro positively as a type of quasi "gold standard." By not being able to inflate its problems away,
Ireland along with other periphery eurozone countries are facing the reality that their fiscal paths are unsustainable and that prices, including wages, will need to adjust accordingly. These price adjustments permit the relative price structure to realign to signal entrepreneurs and investors what production and investment plans are sustainable.
Two Types of IMF Bailouts
Though both countries eventually succumbed to IMF-led bailouts, important differences in their implementations abound. Ireland's bailout by the ECB and IMF came with some high costs, although capital controls aimed at inhibiting the outflow of funds were absent. As a result, trade flows continued largely as usual, with exports increasing due to its increased competitiveness through price deflation.
Icelandic Capital Controls
Iceland became the first developed country in over 30 years to request aid from the IMF (Gylfason 2011) . When accepting emergency loans, the IMF imposed strict capital controls as part of the package (International Monetary Fund 2010; Yeyati 2011) . The aim of the controls was to: 1) limit foreign currency outflows, 2) stop the exchange rate from depreciating further, and, 3) keep foreign exchange available for vital transactions. While the controls were originally temporary in nature, they persist to this day with no plans to taper them off until 2015 at the earliest.
These controls resulted in some unintended consequences, and in many ways differed from the conventional or more modern use of capital controls. In particular, as part of the IMF's standby agreement of November 2008, residents and non-residents were obliged to report all foreign exchange transactions to the Central Bank of Iceland. Residents were forced to surrender all foreign exchange to the central bank within two weeks of obtaining it by depositing the proceeds in a domestic bank. Divestments of foreign direct investments in Iceland were not permitted. Finally, only financial products denominated in króna were allowed under the controls.
Some have called a return to such harsh capital controls draconian, and their use marks a strict departure from how the IMF has more recently implemented emergency relief (Arnason and Danielsson 2011) . While capital controls are increasingly seen as a way to prevent excess foreign investment from overheating an economy, these controls have marked a shift backward to controlling all transactions, even those that are potentially beneficial. By placing blanket controls over the whole economy, currency flows that would have been beneficial (e.g., purchasing imports necessary for the sustainability of a small, isolated island) have been placed in the same category as those deemed troublesome (e.g., carry traders liquidating króna holdings and depreciating the currency further).
These controls have inhibited the Icelandic recovery by removing several options from citizens trying to recover lost economic activity. Entrepreneurs must seek permission from the CBI to procure foreign funds to invest abroad. Emigration from the country is limited, as individuals have no guarantee that they can take their financial capital with them. Domestically the controls could also be depreciating the króna, thus harming sectors reliant on imports (such as the food industry). Since Icelandic exporters have limited confidence in their future ability to access their earnings, they do not bring home all their foreign earnings. This has the effect of keeping the currency weaker than would otherwise be the case (Gylfason 2011 ).
Unable to easily get króna out of the country, foreign investors find themselves with limited options for any currency held in Iceland. Much of it is today being funnelled into real estate-thus propagating a new bubble in the housing sector (Valdimarsson 2012) . International investors wary of channelling their savings into the current outlets, and lacking investment opportunities in avenues they deem sustainable, are at a loss for options. Thus investing in a real asset like real estate, even if it creates a new bubble, is less risky than remaining invested in Icelandic financial assets that might lose value if the recession renews itself.
More detrimental, perhaps, is the fact that the controls reduce foreign trust in the economy. By blocking divestments on projects funded by incoming foreign direct investment (FDI), the CBI has created a clear disincentive for foreigners to invest in Iceland. Coupled with this is the fact that Iceland has the highest number of restrictions on foreign direct investment of all member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (Kalinova et al. 2010) , contributing to a collapse in domestic investment.
delays full recovery. Additionally, the controls delay one important price adjustment from occurring. Although a depreciation of the króna by itself is not a panacea for the economyrelative price adjustments must also occur-it is true that the króna was artificially overvalued leading up to the crisis, mostly due to ample government guarantees on the banking sector partially propping up the currency, making this currency adjustment more difficult to obtain. It is also difficult to ascertain whether the controls have any meaningful effect today. The exchange rate has already fallen by more than half over the past four years. Much capital had already left the country before the controls were established, and there may be little incentive for divestments to occur now. In fact, given the partially recovered state of the Icelandic economy, it is more likely that the controls are inhibiting capital inflows by removing an exit option from investments than keeping existing investments within the country.
Ireland's Maintained Trade and Financial Flows
Despite also being the recipient of funding through the IMF, Ireland was not subject to capital controls. The reasons are twofold. First, since Ireland is a part of the eurozone, there is no possibility of managing its exchange rate by such a policy. Second, barriers to trade would have conflicted with existing EU treaties. Consequently, the country has not been impaired by such policies, and capital flows have aided Ireland's return to normalcy-unlike that of its northern neighbour.
The distinction in the treatment of two countries making use of an IMF emergency loan is stark. Ireland was spared the curtailment of FDI in light of the fact that capital could still flow freely into, and more importantly out of, the country. Investors could make liberal use of the country's unemployed citizens and lower wages without fear that they would not be able to exit with their funds if the project failed to meet their expectations.
The results are evident in Ireland's trade balance. Net exports have increased from less than 10 percent of GDP to almost 20 percent since the crisis began. While domestic demand for Irish goods has been falling, foreigners willing to take advantage of its newfound competitiveness have taken up the slack, and exports now lead the recovery. Foreign direct investment has also remained strong, reaching 11.9 and 8.6 percent of GDP in 2009 and 2010, higher than it has been for over a decade.
Conclusion
This comparison has shed light on several key differences between Iceland's and Ireland's policies in the wake of their financial collapses. In implementing policies to ease the effects of these two crises, three aspects stand out.
The first is the role of the countries' currencies in returning them to competitiveness.
Ireland was unable to depreciate its currency, but the domestic price level was able to fall, thus compensating by depreciating the real value of its euro and lowering export costs. In Iceland the quick depreciation of the króna served to give the country a quick cost-based advantage. These across-the-board cost decreases from the depreciation did little to rectify the price maladjustments that the boom bred. In this way, Ireland suffered in the short run through an output decline, but by allowing the array of relative prices to adjust Irish entrepreneurs are now able to see the areas of the economy most conducive to growth.
Second, Ireland's use of the euro protected it from some worse fates. Third, the nationalization of the financial sector in Ireland has left taxpayers on the hook for billions of euros. By allowing a large part of its financial sector to fail, Icelandic authorities have saved its taxpayers from funding a risky project. This has made funds available for social programs that have aided the unemployed throughout the crisis. Furthermore, allowing an insolvent banking sector to fail has allowed resources to be redirected, unlike in Ireland.
Iceland and Ireland provide two case studies for challenges facing an economy facing a modern banking crisis. Other countries, notably the United States and United Kingdom, have banking situations that feature similar weaknesses, including 1) poorly collateralized loans, 2) a reliance on continued credit expansion to roll over short-term funding, and 3) heavy exposure to the real estate market. There are three lessons to take from these two countries.
First, any losses in the banking sector are only the previous mistakes and malinvestments made visible. Covering up losses via bank bailouts does little to fix mistakes that were made in the past, and may delay recovery moving forward. When the tale of these two crises is told, the conclusion is typically that one set of policies was more beneficial than the other. In this paper I have shown that the truth lies somewhere in the middle. Icelanders have benefited by evading a debt overhang through an undue bank bailout that shielded investors from losses. The Irish commitment to open capital markets and a willingness to reduce domestic prices to regain competitiveness has allowed prices to return to levels necessary for entrepreneurs to use as signals to invest. Countries facing similar crises-be they currency, banking, or generally economic-would be well-advised to heed these lessons when drafting recovery plans of their own.
